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ABSTRACT 
Agricultural transition in the former Soviet Union has, surprisingly for many observers, not 
led to a widespread adoption of individual farming. This article attempts to understand some 
previously  neglected  forces  behind  this  outcome.  It  develops  a  theoretical  model  of  farm 
restructuring in which managers exploit the preferences of workers for conformity within a 
social reference group to cement their own power. The model provides a rationale for the 
persistent support among workers and managers to the status-quo organisation, despite the 
availability of a more efficient individual farming option. Based on empirical evidence, we 
argue that managers have an incentive to keep horizons of workers limited by sheltering them 
from pro-reform influences. Polar reform equilibria are generated that are consistent with the 
observed  spatial  patterns  of  restructuring.  The  model  predicts  that  policies  aiming  at  the 
establishment  of  independent  farms  will  fail  unless  they  induce  a  ‘big  push’  in  reform 
attitudes among workers. 
Keywords:  Agricultural  transition;  former  Soviet  Union;  social  interaction  effects;  farm 
restructuring. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
After one and a half decades of agricultural transition in the former Soviet Union, economists 
continue to be puzzled by the lack of change in farming organisation in all but a few successor 
countries. The persistence of large farms is particularly outstanding in Ukraine and Russia. 
Although entrusted with formal property rights in land and assets, agricultural workers as the 
new  owners  seem  to  be  quite  hesitant  to  establish  smaller  family  farms.  Due  to  their 
prevalence in most market economies, these have commonly been regarded as a blueprint for 
farm restructuring (KOESTER 2005). However, as LERMAN et al. (2004, 123) note in a recent 
monograph on the state of agricultural transition in this region,  
“The overwhelming majority of farm workers in Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova prefer to keep their land and 
asset shares in the former collective, which in the meantime has reregistred as a corporate farm with a new 
market-sounding name. They waive their right of exit, at least for the time being, and pool their resources to 
create a corporate structure.” 
A common explanation for this absence of change has been that exit costs for individual 
workers are too high, because they lack the physical and human resources to take the risk of 
running a business on their own, and because up- and downstream markets are still largely 
geared to large collective successor farms (See MATHIJS and SWINNEN 1998 and RIZOV 2003 
for expositions of these arguments).  
There is no doubt that lacking resources and pervasive market imperfections are major reform 
obstacles. However, this explanation remains unsatisfying or at least incomplete because it is 
unable to deal with a number of observations that have been made in the course of transition.  
First, why is it that not only the managers of large farms, but also the group of agricultural 
workers apparently stand united to oppose the establishment of smaller private farms in those 
countries where reform is stagnating?  
Second, why is it that local up- and downstream markets do not develop to better serve the 
needs  of  small  farmers?  If  family  farms  are  a  superior  mode  of  organisation,  economic 
incentives  exist  to  overcome  prevailing  market  imperfections.  An  explanation  is  hence   3 
required why individual entrepreneurs do not emerge to set up a more favourable business 
environment for private farmers, as it does exist in most Western economies. 
Third,  why  do  we  observe  such  a  striking  duality  in  reform  patterns  across  the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)? Whereas large farm structures remained more 
or less untouched in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and the Central Asian republics, there has been 
a complete dismantling of collectives and a far-reaching individualization of agriculture in the 
Baltics and the Trans-Caucasian countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (ROZELLE and 
SWINNEN 2004). It seems that resource endowments and market failures are matters of degree, 
so that more evenly distributed reform outcomes across countries and regions would have 
been expected. 
This  paper  offers  an  alternative  explanation  for  the  persistence  of  pre-reform  farming 
structures in the CIS countries that is consistent with these observations. It is based on the 
argument that corporate farm managers exploit the tendency of workers for conformity within 
the collective to cement their own power. Building on commonplace observation and theories 
of  social  psychology,  we  argue  that  farm  workers  have  preferences  for  behaving  in 
conformity with peers. We then assume that farm managers benefit from the pre-reform status 
quo, because it assures them access to income, local power and prestige. These managers may 
find it expedient to manipulate their workers in a way that they reject any organisational 
change  as  being  not  conform  with  the  norm.  It  is  suggested  that  workers  either  receive 
monetary benefits in exchange for behaving loyally to the manager, or managers may actively 
keep  the  horizon  of  farm  workers  limited.  They  do  this  by  withholding  information 
concerning privatisation rights, preventing political organisation, not allowing outsiders to 
invade the village or start businesses with defecting workers, and by stressing the necessity of 
‘collective solutions’ to problems. 
By modifying a framework due to SCHAFFNER (1995), these arguments are formalised and 
their theoretical implications derived. It is shown that farm managers have an incentive to 
employ workers that are loyal to them and to alienate outsiders who might undermine this 
loyalty, and that they may be willing to sacrifice farm profits for benefits that arise from 
keeping the pre-reform structures. Workers in turn may find the status-quo organisation of 
agriculture just ‘normal’ and thereby perpetuate its existence, although a higher paying reform 
alternative exists. Whether farm managers pay workers higher wages to keep them loyal or 
whether they sequester them depends on the relative costs of both options, and a mixture of 
both strategies may prevail in a given region. A regional equilibrium is derived in which 
either all corporate farms in a given area remain intact or all farms are dissolved. These 
implications are shown to be largely consistent with the evidence.
1 
2  THE MODEL 
2.1  Individual vs. social utility 
Despite its intuitive plausibility, economists have only recently paid increasing attention to 
the  formal  modelling  of  social  interaction  effects  (see  BROCK  and  DURLAUF  2001  for  an 
overview). A standard approach has been to split the utility function into an individual and an 
additively separable social component.  Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that deviations 
far from group average are penalised more strongly (JONES 1984). Given a choice variable, 
0 ³ l , the resulting composite utility function, 
* u , may then be represented as follows: 
                                                 
1   The following is a shortened version of PETRICK and CARTER (2007), to which the reader is referred for 
further details.   4 
( ) ( )
2 * ) ( ) ( l l l - - = v g u u ,  (1) 
with individual utility  (.) u , social utility  ( )
2 ) ( l l - v . The function (.) g  transforms  l  into a 
utility-relevant magnitude, for example income, and  l  is average behaviour in the social 
reference group. Moreover,  0 ' , ' > v u .  
As will be discussed in detail below, (1) formalises the idea that individuals have preferences 
for conformity with their peers, or doing what is the normal thing to do in a given social 
reference group. Both increasing positive or negative deviations from group average cause 
increasing  discomfort,  but  there  is  no  discomfort  if  everybody  in  the  group  behaves 
identically and chooses the same l . As a result, outcomes will likely be homogenous within a 
social reference group, but may be radically different between groups.  
2.2  Social reference groups and the geography of the model 
We distinguish two major reference groups that may influence the behaviour of villagers, 
which we denote regional and national. The regional reference group is the community of 
people living in geographical proximity to the individual. We pragmatically identify this with 
the county or raion, which has been the lower level of the two-tiered administrative system 
throughout  the  former  Soviet  Union.  In  most  rural  regions  of  Ukraine  and  Russia,  each 
collective farm forms the economic and social centre of a village, and a raion contains a 
dozen or so collective farms. Sociological field work in rural Russia has shown that there has 
been some mobility within localities, for example because villages were abandoned by the 
government  and  the  population  forced  to  relocate  to  nearby  places.  However,  most  rural 
people spend their entire life in a certain area, where they are surrounded by their relatives 
(O’BRIEN et al. 2000, 95). People living in a region are more likely to meet in person on a 
regular basis and hence form a natural social reference group.
2 Social interaction within this 
reference group, and information flow in particular, is hard to manipulate by local authorities. 
As a second reference group we posit a wider, potentially non-rural population that provides 
an alternative blueprint for what is the right thing to do and how to behave. With regard to de-
collectivisation in agriculture, the mode of behaviour of this social reference group is codified 
in the national reform legislation, which gives an individual worker the right to leave the 
collective and withdraw his/her assets. It is identified with a reform-oriented, urban majority, 
and with family farms in Western Europe or North America, which are presented as a model 
for agricultural restructuring. In countries with a strong tradition of individualised farming 
prior  to  collectivisation,  the  members  of  former  generations  may  constitute  part  of  the 
reference group. Information about this social reference group is primarily transmitted via the 
media, through television or newspaper, through tradition, but also via agents of change who 
enter a community, in village congregations, or by word of mouth.
3 In contrast to the narrow 
reference group, interaction with the wide reference group can assumedly be influenced by 
the local  farm manager. He may or may  not keep the horizon of his  workers limited by 
                                                 
2   In  addition,  many  regions  are  homogenous  in  ethnic  terms,  some  of  them  officially  recognised  as 
autonomous areas subject to the ethno-territorial principle of both the former Soviet and the current Russian 
constitutions (STADELBAUER 1996, 42-49). 
3   In Russia, this reference group has been represented by the reform-oriented Association of Peasant Farms and 
Agricultural  Cooperatives  of  Russia  (AKKOR).  According  to  WEGREN  (1995,  28-29),  AKKOR  had  a 
network of branches in every oblast by the mid 1990s. Since its foundation it has held annual congresses and 
publishes an own weekly newspaper, ‘The Russian Farmer’. It supports private property and freedom of land 
use. Although its primary constituents are private peasant farmers, it appears to have more support in urban 
than in rural areas. Similar movements exist in other CIS countries.    5 
withholding information concerning privatisation and other civil rights, preventing political 
organisation  of  farm  workers,  not  allowing  outsiders  to  invade  the  village,  inhibiting  the 
creation  of  support  networks  or  businesses  for  private  farmers,  frightening  defectors,  and 
stressing collective identity and local ‘collective solutions’ to problems.
4 The degree to which 
the  manager  keeps  horizons  limited  determines  how  strongly  farm  workers  identify 
themselves with the wider, reform-minded reference group, as will be formalised below.  
2.3  Workers’ and managers’ choice 
Farm workers have preferences, u, for income, y, and additive preferences, v, for conformity 
with  other  workers  in  their  reference  group.  Their  income  depends  on  a  binary  loyalty 
decision,l . They may either stay on the local corporate farm,  1 = l , in which case they 
support the farm manager in local politics, e.g. voting for him in the farm assembly, and do 
not exert their right in asset shares of the farm. Loyal workers receive an annual wage, w. 
Labour contracts can be enforced costlessly by the corporate farm manager and there is no 
other  employer  in  reach  for  farm  workers  than  the  local  corporate  farm.  Alternatively, 
workers  may  choose  to  become  independent  farmers  and  withdraw  their  assets  from  the 
corporate farm,  0 = l , in which case they receive an income from private farming,  ) (
r f l , 
where 
r l  the share of loyal workers in region r who have not taken up private farming and 
have loyally remained on the corporate farm.  We assume that  0 '< f  to capture various types 
of network externalities, for example the necessary political support for restructuring up- and 
downstream markets for private farmers, and learning processes and information spill-overs 
among  reform  oriented  entrepreneurs  to  reduce  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  in  decision 
making.
5  It is assumed that farm workers make comparisons among each other with regard to how loyal 
they are to the corporate farm management. An individual perceives the more discomfort the 
stronger he/she deviates from average group behaviour in terms of loyalty, expressed by the 
share of loyal workers in the reference group,  l . Utility is assumed to decrease with the 
composite term 
2 ) ( l l - . For simplicity it is assumed that both utility functions are linear, 
hence  0 const ' , ' > = v u . 
A  farm  manager  allocates  the  labour  force  of  his  farm,  N,  and  other  assets  to  produce 
composite farm revenue, by using a given technology. Corporate farm assets are the sum of 
all individual asset shares, and asset shares can be withdrawn by workers if they wish. The 
manager is assumed to be the residual claimant of farm profit.
6 A manager therefore benefits 
from the loyalty of farm workers, who support him politically, perpetuate the existence of the 
collective farm and thus secure his income and local power. Although not modelled formally 
here, benefits for the manager may also be of a psychological nature.
7 In the following, we 
focus only on the loyalty decision of workers and simply assume that all other production 
                                                 
4   See CSAKI and LERMAN (1997, 4) for empirical evidence on how farm managers use information control to 
keep horizons limited. 
5   While there is now an established body of literature on economic network effects in agglomeration, only 
more recently has interest increased in how social interactions foster the emergence of entrepreneurs in a 
given region (see MINNITI 2005 for an overview). 
6   Little is known about the remuneration of the core management of corporate farms. KOESTER (1999, 216) 
reports  that  many  of  the  farm  chairmen  appear  to  enjoy  a  respectable  living  standard  despite  the  poor 
economic situation of agriculture. It is hence assumed that they are the de facto residual claimants of profits. 
7   Psychological benefits may arise because managers enjoy being the ‘head of a commune’ (AMELINA 2000, 
503). The manager may also have a preference for seeing agricultural production organized in corporate 
farms.  This  could  be  the  case  if  he/she  has  professional  concerns  that  the  farm’s    dissolution  will  be 
economic mischief and lead to a food crisis (KOESTER 2005, 109).   6 
factors available to the manager are allocated in a standard profit-maximising way, hence 
generating a gross profit of P for the manager. 
Being  aware  of  social  reference  group  effects  among  his/her  workers,  a  manager  can 
deliberately keep the horizon of farm workers limited by sheltering them from the national 
reference group and by exerting explicit or implicit political and social pressure on them, as 
described above. Let  1 = q  if the manager actively keeps the horizon of his loyal workers 
limited and  0 = q  otherwise, with  ] 1 .. 0 [ Î q . Limiting the horizon has an influence on which 
reference group farm workers use to assess their utility from behaving loyally to the manager. 
If workers’ horizon is kept limited, they compare their own behaviour with that of all other 
workers in the region, 
r l l = . If the horizon is not kept limited, they compare their behaviour 
with a wider, national reference group,
n l l = . The national reference group is assumed to be 
at least moderately reform-minded on average, so that  5 . 0 <
n l . As a consequence, workers 
who accept the wider social reference group always experience less discomfort from choosing 
disloyalty than from remaining loyal to the manager. It is assumed that 
n l  is exogenous and 
can not be influenced by decisions of individual farm workers. By choosing q , the manger 
determines  the  relative  weight  of  the  two  possible  reference  groups  of  workers: 
n r l q l q l ) 1 ( - + = . How costly it is to keep horizons limited is given by a cost function 
) , ( R C C q
q q = . Costs may arise from own political activity of the manager to turn down 
reform-minded influences from outside the region, or bribes to public authorities who might 
stand  up  for  civil  rights  of  workers.  This  function  depends  on  a  vector  of  regional 
characteristics,  R,  that  includes  the  existence  of  conservative  vs.  reform-oriented  political 
networks in a given region, strength of collective vs. individual traditions, distance to urban 
centres,  climatic  and  technological  dimensions  of  agricultural  production,  etc  (such 
differences are discussed, e.g., by AMELINA 2000). It is assumed that  0 1 >
q C  and  0 11 >
q C , 
implying that it is marginally costlier to achieve higher levels of sheltering. The survival of 
the corporate farm in a given village depends on the ability of its manager to assure loyalty of 
a sufficient number of workers in that village, subject to a budget constraint. 
The optimisation problem for a farm worker is hence: 
( )
2 ) ( ) ( Max l l
l
- - = v y u u
w   (2) 
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The optimisation problem for a manager in village j in region R is: 
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where constraint (6) defines the corporate farm’s budget constraint and constraint (7) defines 
the loyalty participation constraint (hereafter denoted as the LPC). Both will be just binding   7 
under optimising behaviour. Note that in the model corporate farm output only depends on 
retaining a loyal labour force and the manager’s task is simply to minimise the cost of keeping 
workers loyal. 
Managers  make  decisions  concerning  q   and  w,  to  which  workers  react  by  choosing  l , 
according  to  the  utility  they  derive  from  behaving  loyally  or  disloyally  to  the  manager. 
Because the decision of a single worker not only depends on the manager’s offer but also on 
the  behaviour  of  other  individuals  in  his/her  social  reference  group,  identical  offers  by 
managers may lead to different workers’ response in different regions. This is analysed in 
further detail below. 
To  summarise  the  intuition,  workers’  relative  remuneration  is,  in  two  distinct  ways, 
influenced  by  social  interaction  effects.  First,  there  is  a  market  effect.  The  latter  may  be 
described as a network externality or critical-mass phenomenon that influences the monetary 
returns from independent farming. The more workers turn into private farmers, the easier it is, 
both  economically  and  politically,  to  establish  independent  farming  as  an  accepted 
organisational  mode.  Second,  there  is  a  psychological  effect,  according  to  which  non-
conformity with the reference group causes discomfort.  
3  LEAST-COST ELICITATION OF LOYALTY 
Recalling  that  we  use  LPC  to  denote  the  loyalty  participation  constraint 
( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( = - = º l l
w w u u LPC ),  the  minimizing  the  cost  of  loyalty  elicitation  yields  the 












which in the optimum state is equal to the marginal cost of securing loyalty of workers.  









w = .  (8) 
The left hand side of (7) describes an isocost curve of securing loyalty. The right hand side 
describes a loyalty indifference curve, that is the locus of all  w , q  combinations where the 
joint effect of q  and w just suffices to make  ) 1 ( = l
w u  as high as  ) 0 ( = l
w u . Analysing the 
single components of the optimality condition allows us to be more precise with regard to the 
shape of the isocost and loyalty indifference curves. From the definition of 
m C  in (5) follows 
that  const = = j
m
w N C , that is the costs of a marginal wage increase is determined by the 
number of workers. Furthermore, given our earlier assumption about the costs of limiting the 
horizon,  0 1 > =
q
q C C
m . The more q  is used, the costlier is the marginal increase. The isocost 
curve therefore has a concave shape (Figure 1). The budget constraint (6) defines a maximum 
wage  N C w / ) ( max
q - P =  the manager is able to offer. It is determined by the collective 
farm’s  productivity,  the  extent  to  which  horizons  are  actively  limited  and  potential 
opportunity  costs  of  the  manager  (assumed  zero  henceforth).  If  there  is  no  limiting  of 
horizons,  wmax  can  be  drawn  into  Figure  1  as  shown,  assuming  that  the  solid  cost  curve   8 
displays the manager’s budget. wmax then denotes the locus at which  f w =  for a given 
r l  if 
0 = q , that is loyalty elicitation occurs only through wage payments.
8 
Because 
q C   is  also  dependent  on  regional  characteristics,  R ,  different  regions  exhibit 
different  isocost  curves.  The  southeast  shift  shown  in  Figure  1  is  induced  by  relatively 
increasing costs of limiting the horizon vis-à-vis the wage costs.  














Source: authors’ figure. 
It  is  also  possible  to  determine  the  shape  of  the  loyalty  indifference  curve.  To  ease  the 
analysis, we assume that  0 =
n l .  Under this assumption and after substituting (2) to (4) into 
the LPC, the latter becomes: 
r r r v v f u w u v f u v w u LPC l q l q l q 2 ) ( ) ( ) ) (( ) ( ) ) 1 (( ) (
2 2 + - - = + - - - º . 













- = - = . 
Under the assumption of constant marginal utility of income for the loyal worker, this term is 
a constant. The loyalty indifference curve, within the [0..1] boundaries, is thus a straight line 
that becomes steeper as 
r l decreases.  In words, how effective it is to keep horizons limited in 
a given region depends on how many workers are (still) loyal. Keeping horizons limited is a 
perfect substitute for increasing wages, as long as there are loyal workers in the region and as 
long horizons are not yet fully limited. 
Both the isocost and loyalty indifference curves may now be drawn into one figure, in which 
the  tangency  point  satisfies  the  optimality  condition  (8)  and  thus  determines  the  optimal 
choice of q  and w for securing loyalty of workers (Figure 2), denoted with asterisks. Note 
first that, for a given 
r l , different isocost curves in different regions as displayed in Figure 1 
                                                 
8   In actual practice, a part of the wage may be paid in-kind, including inputs and machinery access for the 
worker’s household plot and other non-monetary benefits, such as discounted meals in the corporate farm’s 
cafeteria or access to health services.   9 
would lead to varying optimal elicitation strategies. Regional characteristics determine how 
managers elicit loyalty and how costly it is. In regions where politically influential managers 
cannot afford to pay higher wages, they will resort to a strategy of keeping horizons limited in 
order to secure the survival of their corporate farm.  
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Source: authors’ figure. 
Furthermore, Figure 2 shows the effects of changes in average reference group behaviour as 
captured  by
r l .  A  decrease  in  average  loyalty  of  the  reference  group  has  two  effects,  as 
shown by the move from the higher 
2 l  to the smaller 
1 l . First, the loyalty indifference curve 
shifts  out  to  the  right,  because  workers  need  a  higher  compensation  for  their  increased 
disutility from remaining loyal. Furthermore, it becomes steeper because limiting of horizons 
is now less effective and the wage equivalent to a given increase in q  shrinks. As a result, the 
manager needs a larger budget to keep workers loyal; the new isocost curve obeying the 
tangency condition lies further northeast. In addition, relatively less limiting of horizons and 
higher wage payments will be in the least-cost solution of the manager. Note that the manager 
may have already exploited his maximum budget, denoted by wmax on the horizontal axis, so 
that it is no longer feasible to keep workers loyal to the collective. This would indeed be the 
case in Figure 2. 
4  REGIONAL REFORM EQUILIBRIUM WITH SOCIAL INTERACTION EFFECTS 
This section analyses how the interaction between managers and workers and among workers 
drives reform choices in the model and shows how polar equilibria may be induced, with 
either all or no farm workers loyal to corporate farm managers. To do this, we focus on a 
single geographic region comprised of identical corporate farms. We proceed in three steps 
that are illustrated by the three charts in Figure 3. First, we investigate the pure market effect 
of social interaction. After that, the psychological effect and the effect of limiting horizons are 
added. 
Figure 3 (a)-(c) display the wage workers require to remain loyal as a function of the regional 
share of loyal workers, 
r l . The solid line in each graph hence denotes the participation wage 
that assures that the LPC (7) is just binding.    10 
Figure  3  (a)  assumes  that  there  is  no  social  utility  associated  with  loyalty  or  disloyalty 
(i.e., 0 = v ). The solid line shows the pure monetary or market effect of each worker’s loyalty 
decision, driven by the productivity of private farming, f. It illustrates how positive network 
externalities  from  establishing  independent  private  farms  lead  to  higher  pay-offs  if  more 
workers choose disloyalty. Wage payments higher than f imply that workers remain loyal, 
whereas payments lower than f lead workers to withdraw.   
The term  ) 1 ( min = =
r f w l denotes the minimum wage the manager must offer if all workers 
in  the  locale  are  loyal.    Note  that  this  is  the  circumstance  when  private  farming  is  least 




= max  indicates the maximum wage that the manager can afford to 
offer, given the productivity of the collective farm. The intersection of wmax with the solid f-
line  defines  a  regional  lower  threshold  of  loyal  workers,
r
l l .  If
r l falls  below  this  lower 
threshold,  corporate  farming  will  no  longer  be  sustainable  in  the  region  and  the  only 
institutional equilibrium for the region will be complete agricultural privatisation.  
We  thus  see  the  sense  in  which  this  model  has  a  tipping  point  at
r
l l .  At  loyalty  levels 
above
r
l l ,  corporate  farming  will  be  retained.  But  once  a  critical  mass  of  reform-minded 
workers is reached, the reform equilibrium is self reinforcing. For this reason, even though 
independent  farming  yields  higher  pay-offs,  external  forces,  for  example  an  information 
campaign, may be necessary to reach this equilibrium. How likely it is that private farms 
emerge  depends  on  the  location  of 
r
l l .  The  further  this  is  on  the  left,  the  higher  the 
probability that collective farms remain intact. 
We consider now what happens when we reintegrate social utility in the model.  Initially, we 
assume  that  horizons  are  not  limited  such  that social  norms  are  set  by  the  national  level 
reference group, i.e.,  5 . 0 < =
n l l . Under this assumption, workers are influenced by pro-
reform groups and feel uneasy about behaving loyally. As illustrated in Figure 3 (b), the 
incorporation of social utility under these assumptions results in a parallel shift of the LPC to 
the northeast.  Loyalty is now more expensive to elicit, and the threshold point,
r
l l , shifts to 
the right.  The range over which a regional loyalty equilibrium obtains thus shrinks, making it 
more likely that the region will shift to the full reform or privatisation equilibrium.   11 
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Source: authors’ figure. 
While social effects thus are a threat for the existence of the collective farms (and hence the 
income base and power of the manager), they also provide a mechanism that the manager can 
use to avert this ‘farmer threat’ (VAN ATTA 1993). In our model, the manager can either make   12 
loyalty  more  attractive  by  increasing  wages,  or  influence  the  social  reference  group  of 
workers by actively limiting their horizon. The latter effect is displayed in chart (c), where we 
permit the manager to choose q to be greater than zero. As analysed in the previous section, 
the optimal q increases with
r l . For illustrative purposes, we re-draw the LPC in Figure 3 (c) 
holding q fixed at the  optimal level for some  relatively high level of 
r l . The solid line 
illustrates those wage levels which just meet the LPC for that fixed level of q. For that given 




as the critical value of 
r l such that  5 . 0 ) 1 ( = - + =
n r l l q l . At this 
r l
~
, the individual 





managers can elicit loyalty by offering a wage lower than that required to elicit loyalty in the 




, a higher wage must be paid to elicit loyalty. However, 
this wage will still be weakly less than that required to elicit loyalty when managers do not 
limit horizons in the presence of social effects. Finally, note that wmax and the budget available 




) diminishes when managers choose q > 0. But despite this offsetting 
effect, the capacity of the manager to limit horizons will always shift the threshold loyalty 
level,
r
l l , re-expanding the range over which corporate farming can be sustained, as shown in 
Figure 3 (c). 
By changing the pay-offs, keeping the horizons limited has another profound effect on the 
regional equilibrium which is very much in the interest of the manager: it establishes a second 
polar equilibrium for average regional loyalty levels to the right of 
r l
~
. Once the majority of 
workers  has  decided  to  remain  loyal,  this  process  is  self-reinforcing,  as  indicated  by  the 
additional solid arrow. By stressing the collective identity of workers and keeping away any 
reform-minded attitudes from villagers, the manager can establish a stable equilibrium that 
guarantees the existence of the collective farm. Because workers feel comfortable with doing 
what is, in the community, the normal thing to do, they have an incentive to choose loyalty if 
the  majority  did  so  already.  With  regard  to  workers’  pay-off,  however,  the  polar  loyalty 
equilibrium as drawn in chart (c) is inefficient as compared to the full de-collectivisation 
outcome. Even so, because limiting the horizon shifts the threshold loyalty level 
r
l l  back to 
the left, it makes it even more likely that a loyalty equilibrium occurs.  
5  TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS AND SOME EVIDENCE 
Given  our  basic  assumptions  concerning  social  interaction  effects  among  workers  and 
managers’  incentives  to  keep  horizons  limited,  the  model  provides  a  number  of  testable 
implications:  1.  Within a pool of regions with comparable social and geographical characteristics, there 
are either regions which totally de-collectivise, so that there are no loyal farm workers and 
a widespread establishment of private farms, or regions which keep collectives completely 
intact, so that there are only loyal farm workers and a ‘loyalty culture’ persists. Because 
only  polar  reform  equilibria  are  stable,  there  will  be  no  intermediate  or  mixed 
restructuring outcomes, ceteris paribus. 
2.  Persisting  loyalty  equilibria  can  only  be  overcome  if  a  sufficient  number  of  workers 
decide to leave the collective farm, utilise the network externalities in private farming 
posited  by  the  model  and  thus  ‘jump’  over  the  critical  lower  bound  loyalty  level.  If 
managers  keep  horizons  limited,  marginal  improvements  in  the  relative  returns  to 
independent farming have no effect on workers’ loyalty.    13 
3.  Depending on the relative costs of monetary incentives vis-à-vis limiting horizons in a 
given  locality,  managers  use  different  mechanisms  to  elicit  loyalty.  Where  costs  of 
sequestering villagers from external influences are lower, managers will – ceteris paribus 
– reduce wage levels and more strongly keep horizons limited. Where keeping horizons 
becomes exceedingly costly because widespread access to information and unambiguous 
reform policies ease coordination on a de-collectivisation equilibrium, collective farms 
will dismantle unless managers are able to offer higher wages. 
A  first  piece  of  evidence  that  is  broadly  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  of  polar  de-
collectivisation results comes from a simple comparison of reform patterns in Table 1. All 
countries given in the table started from the Soviet model of large-scale collective and state 
farms, which usually allowed individual farming only in the form of subsidiary household 
plots. In the first group of countries given in the table, the overwhelming share of land was 
individualised  already  five  years  after  reforms  had  started.
9  On  the  other  hand,  farm 
restructuring has been almost absent in all of the bigger successor countries, where the share 
of individual farms rarely has passed the 20-percent mark of total land use even ten years after 
the start of reforms. Moreover, a large share of this is represented by the millions of attached 
household plots that already existed during Soviet times, and it is unclear how much land has 
simply been abandoned. 
Table 1:   Share of individual farms in total agricultural land of some former socialist 
countries (percent) 
  Pre-reform  5 years after start of 
reforms 
8-10 years* after 
start of reforms 
Examples for de-collectivisation equilibria: 
Albania  3  95  n.a. 
Armenia  7  95  90 
Georgia  12  50  44 
Latvia  4  81  87 
Lithuania  9  64  85 
 
Examples for loyalty equilibria: 
     
Belarus  7  16  12 
Russia  2  8  13 
Kazakhstan  0  5  24 
Moldova  7  12  20 
Ukraine  6  10  17 
* depending on data availability.       
Source:  Data compilation taken from ROZELLE and SWINNEN (2004, 426). 
This broad comparison does not take into account the various differences in initial conditions 
which were present despite a common Soviet heritage and which may have explanatory power 
for reform outcomes. For example, ROZELLE and SWINNEN (2004, 439) argue that in countries 
with  labour-intensive  technologies,  individualisation  yielded  substantial  gains  in  technical 
                                                 
9   Also Georgian agriculture is largely dominated by individual farming. Comparatively low figures in the table 
are due to the fact that a considerable share of land lies idle in former state farms, which ceased to operate 
during the civil war 1992-94 (LERMAN et al. 2004, 123).   14 
efficiency and thus induced restructuring. However, in line with the theoretical implications 
of our model, even in adjacent regions with similar production conditions, highly different 
reform outcomes emerged. A first example are the orchard, vineyard and tobacco growing 
regions of Transcarpathia, Moldova, the Crimea and parts of Caucasus. These continued to be 
cultivated  by  corporate  farms  in  Ukraine  and  Moldova  throughout  the  1990s,  while  a 
widespread parcellisation took place in the Trans-Caucasian Republics (see KEGEL 1997 for 
Georgia). A second examples is the Baltic dairying and pig rearing region. This most western 
region of the Russian forest zone now covers Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Northern Ukraine 
(STADELBAUER  1996,  481).  Whereas  production  is  still  dominated  by  collective  farm 
successors in the latter two countries, individualisation has progressed substantially in the 
Baltic countries.  
In PETRICK and CARTER (2007), we present further evidence that is consistent with these 
implications.  Because  there  has  been  little  systematic  research  on  the  relevance  of  social 
interaction  effects  in  our  context,  the  results  are  tentative  and  more  detailed  empirical 
treatments remain for future work. 
6  CONCLUSIONS 
The presence of limited horizons has implications for the design of policies aiming at the 
establishment  of  independent  farms.  Given  a  loyalty  equilibrium,  it  is  not  sufficient  to 
improve managerial resources and relax factor market constraints for prospective individual 
farmers, as argued e.g. by RIZOV (2003). The effect of marginal improvements in individual 
farm profitability on the loyalty equilibrium in our model will be nil. Crucial for reform in the 
present model is the formation of a critical mass of workers who are willing to establish inde-
pendent farms. This could possibly be achieved by support programmes which make loyal 
farm  workers  aware  of  the  fortune  of  successful  non-loyal  workers,  which  lead  to  the 
emergence of individual consciousness raisers among the group of loyal farm workers (and 
not only to the spread of disembodied ideas), or which make it more costly for farm managers 
to keep the horizons of workers limited.  In other words, a ‘big push’ in reform attitudes 
among workers is a precondition for reaching the full de-collectivisation equilibrium, which 
may be induced by a sufficient number of positive examples of independent farming in a re-
gion. Whether fifteen years of stagnation in the non-reforming countries have reinforced or 
eroded  existing  norms  of  collective  production  may  be  an  interesting  issue  for  empirical 
research.   Following SCHAFFNER (1995), our theoretical model represents a subtle departure from the 
traditional assumption of exogenous preferences. By keeping horizons limited, a manager can 
shape the social reference group of workers and thereby influence what they regard as the 
normal thing to do. Moreover, the manager can, for his or her own benefit, deprive workers of 
a more productive reform option. Workers then evaluate individual farming by referring to 
their current reference group, although they would be exposed to a different reference group if 
they left the collective farm. Workers who for some reason escape the limited horizon find 
themselves better off than they thought they would be, and better off than they had been. We 
consider  this  an  interesting  and  fruitful  way  of  combining  economic  analysis  with  social 
psychology  and  broader  ethnographic  and  sociological  insights  to  uncover  the  power 
asymmetries prevalent in the post-Soviet countryside, which may find useful applications in 
other contexts as well. 
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